Introduction
The Communist Revolution is considered to be one of the pinnacle events that reconfigured China’s position within the modern world. Mao Zedong, alongside the CCP and the Gang of Four, were the leading influential figures throughout this revolution. Mao's ideology and absolute determination led the Communist party, or the CCP, to strive towards the creation of Communist China and the destruction of feudalistic, capitalist China without compromise, ultimately affecting every facet of China's political and social structure. Given this, it is no surprise that historians often study the Chinese Revolution by analyzing how Mao would come to materialize radical changes that took place politically, socially and culturally post-1949, until his death in 1976. The aim of this exhibit is to provide an analysis of Mao Zedong’s impacts on China throughout the revolution in three distinct categories: his direction for political legislation, his effects on foreign relations, and his radical alteration of the Chinese culture. This project will investigate these topics within the previously mentioned timeline by using primary source research, considering the perspectives of those involved throughout this revolution. Finally, the exhibit will conclude with a summary of Mao Zedong’s effects on the Chinese Revolution, and look at the effects of the Chinese Revolution in present day China. |
Background of the Chinese Revolution
Governance and Legislation:
Chinese governance and legislation would drastically shift from previous political systems with the arrival of the Soviet-Communists. After the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) takeover in October 1949, the socialist council that proclaimed itself as the “people’s democratic dictatorship led by the working class,”[1] turned its attentions towards agricultural reform, industrial progression, and internal revisions for the socio-political atmosphere. Throughout the early years of the CCP’s reign, the main consciousness behind its legislation reflected exceedingly radical approaches to centralize their authority. Since China had just survived a civil war, and was on the verge of economic collapse, the CCP had to design policies that would benefit their authority, as well as the general population, while remaining loyal to their left Marxist-Leninist ideals.[2] With Mao Zedong as the director of the CCP’s revolutionary dogma, the organization and actions taken-up by the CCP (later known as the PRC) echoed his perception of revolution and development.[3] The Chinese Revolution would continue in this fashion with Mao as the leading influential figure, following Joseph Stalin’s example as dictator of the proletariat working class, with his control over the Party’s future.
Following this early stage of mobilization and economic resurgence, the Communist government would eventually separate itself from Mao’s direct authority becoming increasingly more independent, until the revival of Mao’s vision with “Continuing Revolution,”[4] from the Great Leap Forward. Post-1958 the government would aim at more cultural issues, attempting to correct contradictions within the state over bureaucratic failures and insufficient propositions in the previous decade.[5] With Mao’s instigation of the Cultural Revolution in the 1960s the governance and legislative actions from the CCP would focus on maintaining ideological provisions for the enthusiastic youths determined to re-educated the masses and remove any disillusionment towards Mao and the CCP/PRC. This revival of the Chinese Revolution would then produce radical policies that favored the Chairman’s authority until his death in 1976. Questions on whether the cause of this Anti-rightest backlash and Culture Revolution within government and its policies as a direction to lead the violent masses or as a reaction to China’s situation in this last phase remains a difficult affair to analyze.
[1] Li Fu-ch’un, “The First Five-Year Plan,” as cited in Communist China 1955-1959, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1962): p. 42.
[2] Mao Zedong, The Writings of Mao Zedong, 1949-1976, (New York: M.E. Sharpe Inc., 1986): pp. 33-34+p. 48.
[3] Ibid, p. 10.
[4] Mao Zedong, Quotations from Chairman Mao Tse-tung: New amplified ed, ed. Stuart R. Schram and A. Doak Barnett, (Toronto: Bantam Books, 1967).
[5] Mao Zedong, The Writings of Mao, pp. 364-366.
Culture and Mao:
Culturally speaking, prior to the rule of Mao, China was markedly more interested in respect for authority, blood lines, and were largely more collectivist, in stark contrast to both Western and future Maoist society.[1] For example, Yan Fu had pointed out the Chinese tendency to prioritise the past over the future as a particular flaw, and the need for the use of Western studies in these regards in order to improve China in all aspects, including cultural.[2] Western societies, according to Yan Fu, stressed on equality, virtue, impersonal governance and more open commentaries against social ills and governance. This makes for an interesting backdrop in terms of the transition towards Maoist China, as seemingly Western traits are adopted into Chinese culture, and traditional values are dropped, despite the future rejection of the West to come in the years of Mao’s reign.
In terms of Mao, and his influence on Chinese culture, Mao began to develop on these themes on the improvement of China’s methods of thought and societal and cultural values. As a Marxist-Leninist, Mao theorised society in terms of a mass line, which ran with the people as its motive throughout history serving the hearts and souls of the people.[3] In addition to this, Mao had openly criticised old values of Chinese tradition, such as the Three Cardinals, which was a ‘devil that suppressed individuality.’[4] Over the years, Mao had developed a respectable following that had idolised him for his ‘revolutionary spirit’, as seen through such examples as Mao having lived in a cave in winter of 1936 after the Long March which had also added to his revolutionary reputation, in the name of Communism and the fight against the Nationalist government of the Kuomintang.[5] It is no surprise then, that by the time Mao had been appointed the Chairman of the People’s Republic China and the official leader in 1949, the floodgates had opened for unprecedented and unfathomable radical change.
Following the first incidences of the ‘cult of Mao’ and the praise of Mao Zedong thought in Yan’an in 1943, Mao had begun to transform into the centre of the Chinese Communist Party[6] and thus an unmoveable cultural force. Despite the destruction wrought across the country by natural disasters and the famine that resulted, alongside the poor implementation of the Great Leap Forward, principles of the Great Leap Forward were blindly pursued,[7] despite Mao’s emphasis on individualism.[8] This blind loyalty to the cult of Mao persisted and became more clear during the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. Mao had not actually written highly clear intentions on what the Cultural Revolution would accomplish,[9] and this had many consequences in the years following the Cultural Revolution.
In addition to the massive amounts of violence and destruction of cultural and religious artifacts in the targeting of capitalist roaders, the bourgeoisie and the Four Olds,[10] the years surrounding and during the Cultural Revolution called for a greater cementing of Mao as an aspect of Chinese culture on his own. By 1964, Lin Biao had commissioned the creation of Mao’s Little Red Book and had ordered all soldiers to read and live by Mao Zedong thought.[11] As a result of the lack of clarification by Mao, and the imbalance of Mao as a personal leader and the influence of mass decision making,[12] bizarre and compulsive programs were put into place to be strictly followed during the Cultural Revolution. These programs, implemented by a Red Guard group in Beijing, included compulsory display of Mao’s portrait in streets, households, buses and trains, the broadcasting of Mao Zedong thought on loudspeakers, the sale of Mao literature in all bookstores and restrictions on luxury and pleasure items such as blue jeans, makeup, pets, and alcohol and tobacco for anyone under the age of 35.[13] Youths often wept and rejoiced at mundane things concerning Mao,[14] which is evident of the sheer amount of admiration that they had for Mao as a cultural icon, since he seemed to be apart from the authority figures that they were meant to openly question during the Cultural Revolution. The fact that this much action had been taken from a simple request from Mao emphasises the cultural power that he wielded, even beyond his death in 1976.
[1] Zongli Tang and Bing Zuo, Maoism and Chinese Culture (New York: Nova Science Publisher Inc, 1996): 60, 212-213.
[2] Tang and Zuo, 60.
[3] Tang and Zuo, 206.
[4] Tang and Zuo, 216.
[5] Jonathan Spence, Mao Zedong (New York: Penguin Group, 1999): 87.
[6] Spence, 100-101
[7] Spence, 149.
[8] Tang and Zuo, 211.
[9] Spence, 168.
[10] James Petras, “The Chinese Cultural Revolution in Historical Perspective,” Journal of Contemporary Asia 27, no. 4 (1997): 445.
[11] Spence, 157-158.
[12] Petras, 451; Spence, 168.
[13] Spence, 163.
[14] Spence, 165.
Foreign Relations:
Although China was not unfamiliar with the notion of turbulent foreign relations, the Chinese Revolution made significant changes to these, as China turned from the attacked to the attacker. Before Mao’s rise to power, China was seen as a weak country. Entangled in hostile relations with the Japanese after the Japanese invasion of 1937, China was also experiencing internal conflict between the Communist and Nationalist parties. The United States sent aid to the Nationalist government with hopes that they would be victorious over the Chinese Communist Party, as communism was viewed as a direct threat to democracy and American society. After Mao Zedong and the Chinese Communist Party’s victory of the Nationalist government "in spite of [the Americans]," the Cold War Red Scare was interpreted as a real threat by the American public, which was reflected in the relations between China and the United States at this time. There existed conflict in both the temperament and philosophy of American-Chinese relations which indicated that an alliance between these two countries could not exist while Mao was in power.[1] The Nuclear Arms Race played arguably one of the most important roles in the Cold War, as Mao Zedong was determined to expand his power outwards, which the Americans continued to view as a threat. The Korean and Vietnamese wars were two examples of China and the United States coming head-to-head over their foreign conflicts. The Americans were concerned with preserving democracy and imperialism, which was increasingly difficult as China continued to gain more power under Mao Zedong. The Chinese also believed that the Americans were a “viscous and deadly enemy.”[2] Mao personally saw the Americans as “the greatest threat to his aspirations.”[3] Mao brought China from a weak country to an extremely threatening global superpower, which, during the Cold War, acted as one of America’s greatest concerns regarding the preservation of their society and safety.
The Soviet Union also experienced extremely unpredictable relations with China during her Revolution. The Soviet Union first supported the Kuomintang, and shifted its loyalty in 1926 when Chiang Kai-Shek dismissed his Soviet advisers and placed restrictions on the Communist party’s participation in Chinese government. After the formation of the People’s Republic of China, China and the Soviet Union were quick to align with one another, based on their mutual implementation of socialism and disdain for Western imperialism. Such relations remained amicable until certain Soviet individuals, such as Khrushchev, began critiquing Stalin after his death. There are four main causes for the Sino-Soviet split: conflicts of national interest, the dynamic of a “strategic triangle” between the People’s Republic of China, the Soviet Union and the United States, the impact of Chinese and Soviet domestic politics, and finally the role of ideology.[4] The Sino-Soviet split became increasingly more drastic as criticism developed. Mao was also increasingly concerned with transforming China into an independent world power, which required distancing themselves from the Soviet Union. At the height of the Sino-Soviet split, militaristic action was being taken against one another. Thus, although foreign relations between the Soviet Union and China began as amicable, the Soviet revision of Stalinist policies, and the desire for China to be an independent nation, ultimately caused great conflict between the two nations.
[1] Jing Li, China's America: The Chinese View the United States, 1900-2000, (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2011), 51.
[2] Ibid.
[3] Lorenz Luthi, The Sino-Soviet Split : Cold War in the Communist World, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008), 29.
[4] Danhui Li and Yafeng Xia, “Jockeying for Leadership: Mao and the Sino-Soviet Split, October 1961- July 1964,” Journal of Cold War Studies 16, no. 1, (2014): 24.
Governance and Legislation:
Chinese governance and legislation would drastically shift from previous political systems with the arrival of the Soviet-Communists. After the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) takeover in October 1949, the socialist council that proclaimed itself as the “people’s democratic dictatorship led by the working class,”[1] turned its attentions towards agricultural reform, industrial progression, and internal revisions for the socio-political atmosphere. Throughout the early years of the CCP’s reign, the main consciousness behind its legislation reflected exceedingly radical approaches to centralize their authority. Since China had just survived a civil war, and was on the verge of economic collapse, the CCP had to design policies that would benefit their authority, as well as the general population, while remaining loyal to their left Marxist-Leninist ideals.[2] With Mao Zedong as the director of the CCP’s revolutionary dogma, the organization and actions taken-up by the CCP (later known as the PRC) echoed his perception of revolution and development.[3] The Chinese Revolution would continue in this fashion with Mao as the leading influential figure, following Joseph Stalin’s example as dictator of the proletariat working class, with his control over the Party’s future.
Following this early stage of mobilization and economic resurgence, the Communist government would eventually separate itself from Mao’s direct authority becoming increasingly more independent, until the revival of Mao’s vision with “Continuing Revolution,”[4] from the Great Leap Forward. Post-1958 the government would aim at more cultural issues, attempting to correct contradictions within the state over bureaucratic failures and insufficient propositions in the previous decade.[5] With Mao’s instigation of the Cultural Revolution in the 1960s the governance and legislative actions from the CCP would focus on maintaining ideological provisions for the enthusiastic youths determined to re-educated the masses and remove any disillusionment towards Mao and the CCP/PRC. This revival of the Chinese Revolution would then produce radical policies that favored the Chairman’s authority until his death in 1976. Questions on whether the cause of this Anti-rightest backlash and Culture Revolution within government and its policies as a direction to lead the violent masses or as a reaction to China’s situation in this last phase remains a difficult affair to analyze.
[1] Li Fu-ch’un, “The First Five-Year Plan,” as cited in Communist China 1955-1959, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1962): p. 42.
[2] Mao Zedong, The Writings of Mao Zedong, 1949-1976, (New York: M.E. Sharpe Inc., 1986): pp. 33-34+p. 48.
[3] Ibid, p. 10.
[4] Mao Zedong, Quotations from Chairman Mao Tse-tung: New amplified ed, ed. Stuart R. Schram and A. Doak Barnett, (Toronto: Bantam Books, 1967).
[5] Mao Zedong, The Writings of Mao, pp. 364-366.
Culture and Mao:
Culturally speaking, prior to the rule of Mao, China was markedly more interested in respect for authority, blood lines, and were largely more collectivist, in stark contrast to both Western and future Maoist society.[1] For example, Yan Fu had pointed out the Chinese tendency to prioritise the past over the future as a particular flaw, and the need for the use of Western studies in these regards in order to improve China in all aspects, including cultural.[2] Western societies, according to Yan Fu, stressed on equality, virtue, impersonal governance and more open commentaries against social ills and governance. This makes for an interesting backdrop in terms of the transition towards Maoist China, as seemingly Western traits are adopted into Chinese culture, and traditional values are dropped, despite the future rejection of the West to come in the years of Mao’s reign.
In terms of Mao, and his influence on Chinese culture, Mao began to develop on these themes on the improvement of China’s methods of thought and societal and cultural values. As a Marxist-Leninist, Mao theorised society in terms of a mass line, which ran with the people as its motive throughout history serving the hearts and souls of the people.[3] In addition to this, Mao had openly criticised old values of Chinese tradition, such as the Three Cardinals, which was a ‘devil that suppressed individuality.’[4] Over the years, Mao had developed a respectable following that had idolised him for his ‘revolutionary spirit’, as seen through such examples as Mao having lived in a cave in winter of 1936 after the Long March which had also added to his revolutionary reputation, in the name of Communism and the fight against the Nationalist government of the Kuomintang.[5] It is no surprise then, that by the time Mao had been appointed the Chairman of the People’s Republic China and the official leader in 1949, the floodgates had opened for unprecedented and unfathomable radical change.
Following the first incidences of the ‘cult of Mao’ and the praise of Mao Zedong thought in Yan’an in 1943, Mao had begun to transform into the centre of the Chinese Communist Party[6] and thus an unmoveable cultural force. Despite the destruction wrought across the country by natural disasters and the famine that resulted, alongside the poor implementation of the Great Leap Forward, principles of the Great Leap Forward were blindly pursued,[7] despite Mao’s emphasis on individualism.[8] This blind loyalty to the cult of Mao persisted and became more clear during the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. Mao had not actually written highly clear intentions on what the Cultural Revolution would accomplish,[9] and this had many consequences in the years following the Cultural Revolution.
In addition to the massive amounts of violence and destruction of cultural and religious artifacts in the targeting of capitalist roaders, the bourgeoisie and the Four Olds,[10] the years surrounding and during the Cultural Revolution called for a greater cementing of Mao as an aspect of Chinese culture on his own. By 1964, Lin Biao had commissioned the creation of Mao’s Little Red Book and had ordered all soldiers to read and live by Mao Zedong thought.[11] As a result of the lack of clarification by Mao, and the imbalance of Mao as a personal leader and the influence of mass decision making,[12] bizarre and compulsive programs were put into place to be strictly followed during the Cultural Revolution. These programs, implemented by a Red Guard group in Beijing, included compulsory display of Mao’s portrait in streets, households, buses and trains, the broadcasting of Mao Zedong thought on loudspeakers, the sale of Mao literature in all bookstores and restrictions on luxury and pleasure items such as blue jeans, makeup, pets, and alcohol and tobacco for anyone under the age of 35.[13] Youths often wept and rejoiced at mundane things concerning Mao,[14] which is evident of the sheer amount of admiration that they had for Mao as a cultural icon, since he seemed to be apart from the authority figures that they were meant to openly question during the Cultural Revolution. The fact that this much action had been taken from a simple request from Mao emphasises the cultural power that he wielded, even beyond his death in 1976.
[1] Zongli Tang and Bing Zuo, Maoism and Chinese Culture (New York: Nova Science Publisher Inc, 1996): 60, 212-213.
[2] Tang and Zuo, 60.
[3] Tang and Zuo, 206.
[4] Tang and Zuo, 216.
[5] Jonathan Spence, Mao Zedong (New York: Penguin Group, 1999): 87.
[6] Spence, 100-101
[7] Spence, 149.
[8] Tang and Zuo, 211.
[9] Spence, 168.
[10] James Petras, “The Chinese Cultural Revolution in Historical Perspective,” Journal of Contemporary Asia 27, no. 4 (1997): 445.
[11] Spence, 157-158.
[12] Petras, 451; Spence, 168.
[13] Spence, 163.
[14] Spence, 165.
Foreign Relations:
Although China was not unfamiliar with the notion of turbulent foreign relations, the Chinese Revolution made significant changes to these, as China turned from the attacked to the attacker. Before Mao’s rise to power, China was seen as a weak country. Entangled in hostile relations with the Japanese after the Japanese invasion of 1937, China was also experiencing internal conflict between the Communist and Nationalist parties. The United States sent aid to the Nationalist government with hopes that they would be victorious over the Chinese Communist Party, as communism was viewed as a direct threat to democracy and American society. After Mao Zedong and the Chinese Communist Party’s victory of the Nationalist government "in spite of [the Americans]," the Cold War Red Scare was interpreted as a real threat by the American public, which was reflected in the relations between China and the United States at this time. There existed conflict in both the temperament and philosophy of American-Chinese relations which indicated that an alliance between these two countries could not exist while Mao was in power.[1] The Nuclear Arms Race played arguably one of the most important roles in the Cold War, as Mao Zedong was determined to expand his power outwards, which the Americans continued to view as a threat. The Korean and Vietnamese wars were two examples of China and the United States coming head-to-head over their foreign conflicts. The Americans were concerned with preserving democracy and imperialism, which was increasingly difficult as China continued to gain more power under Mao Zedong. The Chinese also believed that the Americans were a “viscous and deadly enemy.”[2] Mao personally saw the Americans as “the greatest threat to his aspirations.”[3] Mao brought China from a weak country to an extremely threatening global superpower, which, during the Cold War, acted as one of America’s greatest concerns regarding the preservation of their society and safety.
The Soviet Union also experienced extremely unpredictable relations with China during her Revolution. The Soviet Union first supported the Kuomintang, and shifted its loyalty in 1926 when Chiang Kai-Shek dismissed his Soviet advisers and placed restrictions on the Communist party’s participation in Chinese government. After the formation of the People’s Republic of China, China and the Soviet Union were quick to align with one another, based on their mutual implementation of socialism and disdain for Western imperialism. Such relations remained amicable until certain Soviet individuals, such as Khrushchev, began critiquing Stalin after his death. There are four main causes for the Sino-Soviet split: conflicts of national interest, the dynamic of a “strategic triangle” between the People’s Republic of China, the Soviet Union and the United States, the impact of Chinese and Soviet domestic politics, and finally the role of ideology.[4] The Sino-Soviet split became increasingly more drastic as criticism developed. Mao was also increasingly concerned with transforming China into an independent world power, which required distancing themselves from the Soviet Union. At the height of the Sino-Soviet split, militaristic action was being taken against one another. Thus, although foreign relations between the Soviet Union and China began as amicable, the Soviet revision of Stalinist policies, and the desire for China to be an independent nation, ultimately caused great conflict between the two nations.
[1] Jing Li, China's America: The Chinese View the United States, 1900-2000, (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2011), 51.
[2] Ibid.
[3] Lorenz Luthi, The Sino-Soviet Split : Cold War in the Communist World, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008), 29.
[4] Danhui Li and Yafeng Xia, “Jockeying for Leadership: Mao and the Sino-Soviet Split, October 1961- July 1964,” Journal of Cold War Studies 16, no. 1, (2014): 24.
Governance and Legislation |
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culture and mao |