Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance The Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the People's Republic of China was signed on February 14, 1950, in Moscow, by Joseph Stalin and Mao Zedong. The treaty was authorized on behalf of the Soviet Union by Andrei Yanuarevich Vyshinsky, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, and by Chou En-lai , the Chairman of the State Administrative Council and Minister of Foreign Affairs, on the behalf of China. During the war, in 1945, the Soviet Union and Nationalist China had signed a non-aggression pact. This treaty was similar, but took the Communist Soviet-Chinese friendship one step further to solidify their relationship as allies. In effect, it meant that the Soviet Union now officially recognized the People's Republic of China and recalled their recognition of the Republic of China. This is an example that Communist China was now being taken seriously by other countries.
The treaty consisted of six articles, which aimed to maintain a friendly and peaceful relationship between the Soviet Union and China. The articles of this treaty are what would be expected of a friendly relationship. Both parties agreed not to conspire against one another, would lend militaristic and economic aid to the other if needed, and did not allow either party to take direct action against the other. The treaty itself was signed in the year following the North Atlantic Treaty, and can therefore be interpreted as a Soviet reaction to NATO. Although the Soviet Union would go on to sign the Warsaw Pact in 1955, this treaty strengthened their ties with China to reinforce their allies at a critical time in Soviet history. The Soviet Union therefore regarded Mao and Communist China as their allies. By creating this treaty, the Soviet Union recognized the People’s Republic of China and Mao Zedong as the leader of the country. With this treaty, Mao and Stalin solidified their, not only ideological, but now political relationship to ensure protection against the non-communist West. This treaty was hopeful that peace between the Soviet Union and China would remain peaceful for the next thirty years. |
On the ten major reltionships On the Ten Major Relationships is a speech that was given by Mao Zedong on April 25, 1956, to the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. The speech was given in response to a report conducted on thirty-four areas of Chinese society including industrial, agricultural, transport, commercial, and financial sectors, which had reported problems concerning socialist construction and socialist transformation. These problems are then identified in relation to ten relationships Communist China experienced. An emphasis was placed on the necessity of building socialism greater, faster and better, with more beneficial economical results promised by Mao, who was concerned with protecting Chinese socialism.
This piece is extremely useful in the study of Chinese attitudes towards the Soviet Union, as Mao was extremely critical of the implementation of Socialism within the Soviet Union. In his criticism, Mao referred to the Soviets as “conceited and very arrogant,” with emphasis on the lessons that can be extracted from the Soviet Union’s “grave mistakes.”[1] In this document Mao criticized the Soviet Union’s relationship with their peasants, as he believed they put too much pressure of the peasants for the benefit of the State. This ultimately decreased the peasant’s motivation for production, and weakened their faith in the socialist State. Mao also criticizes the relationship between the central and local authorities. He believes that China, unlike the Soviet Union, must not concentrate all of the power in the central authority, as Mao believed that the local authorities are an essential means of legal enforcement which can greatly aid central authority.[2] Therefore, Mao believed that using both central and local authorities would contribute to a more successful implementation of socialism, compared to the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union is most harshly criticized in the final relationship, the relationship between China and other countries. Mao described the Soviets as people who simply “follow the wind.”[3] This classified the Soviet Union as followers rather than leaders, as “they hold no independent opinion of their own and often go from one extreme to the other.”[4] To emphasize this point, Mao refers to the people who had closely followed and supported Stalin, who were able to completely turn against him. By following the pack, Mao believed that China must recognize that this was a fundamental problem within the Soviet Union that the Chinese must not follow. Although Mao does praise the relationship between the Russian nationality and the minority nationalities, he still approaches this with a critical attitude as he refers to it as “abnormal.”[5] Although the Soviet Union had a successful relationship between the majority and minority populations, Mao cannot compliment the Soviet Union without criticizing it. By criticizing the Soviet Union in each of these areas, Mao demonstrated that the relationship between the two countries was not as amicable as it had once been. This piece ultimately demonstrates the development of unfavourable attitudes of the Chinese towards the Soviet Union. Disagreements between the Soviet Union and China were now beginning to rise. Mao emphasized that there were some aspects of the Soviet implementation of socialism which must be replicated by China, but mostly those which must be avoided. Mao believed that by looking to the Soviet Union, China could have a more successful Communist society, but only by avoiding Soviet mistakes. Although the two countries were similar, Mao was determined to create a differentiation between China and the Soviet Union. Mao maintained a pro-Chinese bias throughout the entire document, with his belief in the superiority of China over the Soviet Union, and their ability to successfully implement socialism. This bias must be regarded in how the Chinese critically interpreted the Soviet Union, but also how the Chinese viewed themselves. [1] Mao Zedong, “On the Ten Major Relationships,” speech, Meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, April 26, 1956. [2] Ibid. [3] Ibid. [4] Ibid. [5] Ibid. |
SOVIET REPORT TO EAST GERMAN LEADERSHIP ON SINO-SOVIET BORDER CLASHES The Soviet Repot to East German Leadership on Sino-Soviet Border Clashes, was sent on March 2, 1969, at the height of the Sino-Soviet split. The author nor the author’s exact location are unknown, similarly, the recipient and their whereabouts are also unknown, which somewhat decreases the source’s credibility. The report recounts the events of the Chinese border provocation on March 2, on the Island of Damansky, in the Primorsky Region.
The Russians believed that the Chinese had been planning this attack for a long time, indicating that the once friendly relations of the Soviet Union and China were no more. Such events had already previously happened in December of 1948, and January of 1949, and had occurred in the same location. This occurrence was different from the previous attacks, as a specially trained unit of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army with a force of more than two hundred men attacked the Soviet-Chinese border, rather than a Hunzy border control. The army was first asked to leave Soviet territory, as this had “been done repeatedly in the past” as the Chinese had previously committed thousands of border violations, increasing exponentially in 1967.[1] However, this instance the Chinese fired at the Russian border guards and this was viewed as a militaristic attack. One surprising fact is that there is no obvious advantage of Damansky Island to the Chinese, there were no settlements or economic production in this area. Without any type of obvious advantage of this island, the Russians believe that Damansky was “chosen as the site for the provocation because such an endeavor could be prepared there secretly and then presented to the world in a version advantageous to the organizers.”[2] Therefore, the Russians believe that this attack had little to do with the actual attack itself, but how it would be interpreted by others. This report is indicative of attitudes towards Mao himself, as the Soviets declare that “the Maoists exacerbate the anti-Soviet hysteria and produce a chauvinist frenzy in the country, creating an atmosphere which enables them to establish Mao Zedong’s anti-Soviet and chauvinist-great power course as the general line of Chinese policy at the IX Party Convention of the CPC.”[3] This document explicitly mentions that relations between China and the Soviet Union were extremely turbulent at this time. Mao had ultimately turned the entire Soviet Union against him. The border problems between China and the Soviet Union occur at the height of the Sino-Soviet split, and demonstrate why these two countries were splitting. Although it is likely that such tensions resulted from numerous actions on both sides, the author of this document believes that the Chinese authorities were the ones who were responsible for such artificial tensions, which they had been planning for the entire decade. The Soviets believed that they had taken all measures “to avoid an escalation of the situation and to prevent incidents and conflicts.”[4] Not only were they taking militaristic action against one another, but their attitudes towards each other had turned from partnership to loathing. Although the author states that Russia would like to return to a state of friendship, they will seek all means to end the current border problem. [1] “Soviet Report to East German Leadership on Sino-Soviet Border Clashes,” March 2, 1969. [2] Ibid. [3] Ibid. [4] Ibid. Sino-Soviet Relations Conclusion The Chinese and Soviet Union began with extremely amicable relations due to their socialist commonality. Over the course of their relationship, tensions began to emerge in the form of criticism, causing a Sino-Soviet split. The split originally resulted from a Soviet Revisionist viewpoint which the Chinese did not agree with. Thus, the Chinese saw themselves as ideologically superior to the Soviet Union. Such a split indicated that China no longer felt weak as a country, and no longer required the assistance or alliance of the Soviet Union. At the height of the split, extreme hostility existed between the Soviet Union and China, however, there were hopes that the two countries would return to their original peaceful state. |