Marshall Testimony of February 20, 1948 The Marshall Testimony of February 20, 1948, was a testimony given by George Marshall outlining a foreign policy recovery program, which expressed the option of sending economic and militaristic aid to China. The Marshall Testimony was heard by the Committee of Foreign Affairs on February 20, 1948, in Washington D.C. The document discusses the benefits and consequences of sending relief to China to support the Nationalist Government, and the impact this would have on the United States. George Marshall had returned from China in 1947, and was therefore considered extremely knowledgeable on current Chinese affairs. Although this is an individual testimony, the fact that it was presented to the United States government, and led to the creation ‘China Aid Act’ in the Foreign Assistance Act of 1948 (also known as the Marshall Plan), solidifies its credibility. Although Marshall does acknowledge that the American fear of communism emotionally influenced American legislation towards communism, this is still an extremely reliable source as it is representative of American attitudes towards China and the Chinese Communist Party in 1948.[1]
At the time of this testimony, the United States feared that the Chinese Nationalist government would be overthrown by the Communist party, led by Mao Zedong. The United States government recognized that the Chinese Nationalist government was militaristically weak, as they had little training, rendering them unable “to conquer the Communist armies by force,” leaving them vulnerable to a surprise attack.[2] In addition to this, thousands of people were also out of work and starving in China at this point. In order to avoid the spread of Communist appeal to impoverished citizens, the American government thus recognized the necessity for economic and militaristic aid. Although the United States had previously sent aid to China, including the training of 39 Chinese divisions, $1.432 billion, with $700 million spent in military lend-lease aid, and 97 Navy ships along with the training on how to operate these vessels, the Americans found that the threat of a Communist China ultimately justified American financial sacrifices.[3] Apart from the monetary loss of sending aid to China, Marshall acknowledged another negative impact of foreign assistance. He argued that such assistance would place more strain on American-Soviet relations, which were already tense.[4] However, although this negative effect is addressed, the “magnitude of the task and the probable costs thereof would clearly be out of all proportion to the results to be obtained.”[5] This document demonstrates that China and its Nationalist government were now regarded as a country in need of protection from Communism, which the United States viewed as a threat to democracy. With increasing fear of communism, American tensions with the Chinese Communist party grew rapidly. The Marshall Testimony is significant in regards to Mao's impact on foreign relations, as Mao Zedong and the Communist party not only posed a threat to the Chinese Nationalist government, but also American Imperialism. Mao Zedong blatantly disagreed with American imperialism, and his increasing rise to power proved an extreme danger to American society. This document sets the tone for how Mao Zedong would change foreign relations throughout his rule. China began as a country in need of help, and would become a force to be reckoned with, by Mao's death in 1976. [1] George Marshall, “The Marshall Testimony of February 20, 1948,” testimony, February 20, 1948, before the Committee of Foreign Affairs, 9. [2] Ibid., 3. [3] Ibid., 3-7. [4] Ibid., 11. [5] Ibid. |
National Intelligence Estimate: COMMUNIST CHINA'S STRATEGIC WEAPONS PROGRAM The National Intelligence Estimate (NIE 13–8/1–69) was compiled by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) and the National Security Agency (NSA) on October 30, 1969. The estimate was presented and agreed upon by all members of the United States Intelligence Board (USIB), except for the Federal Bureau of Intelligence (FBI). This estimate was designed to address the problem of China's strategic weapons program and to estimate the nature, size, and progress of these programs. The document first addresses the problem, forms a conclusion and finally generates a discussion surrounding China’s strategic weapons program. The NIE 13-8/1-69 was an elaboration on a previous estimate which had been complied on February 27, 1969, the NIE 13–8–69.
The program emphasized the production of high yield thermonuclear weapons, which they were “two years away from having a thermonuclear weapon in the medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) weight class, but fission warheads for such missiles could be available now.”[1] The document goes on to describe numerous nuclear weapons that the Chinese could already have available, or which could be made available in the near future. Their primary focus was on the development of liquid fuel strategic missiles, solid propellants, and nuclear weapons, and the initiation of jet medium bomber production.[2] These militaristic (or soon to be) achievements caused fear in America, not only on a political level, but now on a militaristic level. Communist China had now become a nuclear threat to American society and democracy, which severely increased the negative American attitudes towards China. The fear and disdain towards Communist China increasingly grew as Mao created a more powerful China. There are problematic tendencies with this document, as it is based mainly on skepticism, which is acknowledged throughout the text by its authors. Estimating China’s technical and industrial capabilities for developing, producing, and deploying weapon systems was extremely difficult, as there was not enough adequate historical background information to support these estimates.[3] Similarly, many uncertainties in the understanding of the scope, pace, and direction of the Chinese advanced weapons program existed, which did not allow for completely conclusive deductions to be made.[4] Ultimately, much of this document was based on assumption, as the American government had no concrete evidence to support these estimations. This document is significant to the notion that Mao had a significant impact on foreign relations, as America was becoming increasingly fearful of the Chinese. The implementation of developing nuclear weapons implied that China was preparing to attack other countries. Therefore, the Americans, concerned for their own personal safety, dedicated much of their attention to analyzing the threat of the Chinese. China was growing as a world superpower, and was no longer perceived by the Americans as a weak nation. This document demonstrates that the Chinese were no longer just an ideological threat, but they had begun to be taken seriously and regarded as a militaristic threat by foreign countries. [1] National Archives, RG 59, INR/EAP Files: Lot 90 D 99, National Intelligence Estimates, NIE 13–8/1–69, top secret. [2] Ibid. [3] Ibid. [4] Ibid. |
U.S. Imperialism is like a paper tiger U.S. Imperialism is a Paper Tiger, is an excerpt of a talk given by Mao Zedong to a Latin American audience in 1956. This piece is incredibly critical and hostile towards the United States, as Mao attempts to appeal to other anti-imperialist nations. Mao believed that he spoke for the rest of the world, when he declared that the majority of countries detested the United States. Mao’s personal disdain for America derived from the fact that America paraded an “anti-communist banner everywhere in order to perpetrate aggression against other countries.”[1] The anti-communist attitudes of the United States towards China were equally reflected by the Chinese in their anti-imperialist discourse, as demonstrated in this speech.
Mao dedicates much of his speech to the past mistakes of imperialistic nations, from which China had learned many valuable lessons. With numerous countries in the West setting many negative examples, China was able to grow stronger than her imperialistic counterparts.[2] Although Mao had recognized America as a strong nation, he concluded that it is often the weak who win, as exemplified by the War of Resistance.[3] Directly following his assertion that America was a powerful imperialistic power, Mao stated that American strength was merely a façade and only applicable to its industrial production, as it was politically weak. He believed that American political instability resulted from the fact that politics were divorced from the people, and everyone disliked the American government, including the Americans themselves. The United States, as told by Mao, therefore had no popular support, as their policies oppressed and exploited the people. Although Americans appeared to be threatening, due to their lack of popular appeal, they were ultimately ineffectual as, much like a paper tiger, they were “unable to withstand the wind and the rain.”[4] Mao stated that the paper tiger, and by association the United States, must be despised but also taken seriously. He promoted the idea of destroying it 'piece by piece, battle by battle', which would allow the patient Chinese to ultimately be victorious against this paper tiger of American imperialism. This speech affected foreign relations during the Chinese Revolution as audiences were able to easily dissect Chinese hostilities directed towards the Americans. Although the Americans were also fearful and hostile towards the Chinese, this document demonstrated that China saw American imperialism as a threat to their country, which became increasingly more of a concern as the Cold War progressed. The fear of ‘the other,’ and the hostility directed towards both China and the United States by the political leaders of the opposing countries ultimately resulted in a widespread public concern and disdain towards the other. The fact that Mao, a public and authoritative figure, publicly reinforced his anti-American bias and promoted hatred towards the Americans, demonstrates how and why general loathing towards America had increased during the Chinese Revolution. [1] Mao Zedong, “U.S. Imperialism is a Paper Tiger,” talk, talk with two Latin-American public figures, July 14, 1956. [2] Ibid. [3] Ibid. [4] Ibid. Chinese-American Relations Conclusion The American-Chinese relations only grew more hostile throughout the Chinese Revolution. The United States was fearful of communism and the threat that it posed to democracy. The amicable relationship between The United States and the Nationalists was the complete opposite of that with the Communists. The United States viewed China as a weak nation in need of assistance, and sent monetary aid to the Nationalist government, in an attempt to avoid a Communist victory in China. Once Mao Zedong came to power, the Americans became increasingly more fearful of the Chinese Communists, and the threat that they posed to democratic society. This is apparent by the increasing militaristic threat they posed, in response to Mao's rapid production of nuclear weapons. The feeling of disdain was mutual, as the Chinese also deeply despised the Americans. Mao Zedong emphasized extremely anti-imperialist views, which contributed to the mutual hatred between the two countries. Ultimately, tensions grew over the course of the Revolution, as both sides did not agree with the other's form of politics. Mao Zedong therefore greatly influenced foreign relations, as his anti-imperialistic attitude and nuclear development brought China from a country that posed no threat to American society, to become a strong independent country, which had the potential to be detrimental to the United States. |